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Howsare: Kelo in South Carolina: Economic Development Is Not a Public Use
KELO IN SOUTH CAROLINA?: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Is NOT A PUBLIC USE

FOR PURPOSES OF EmINENT DOMAIN IN SOUTH CAROLINA

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Kelo v. City of New
London' created a flood of public criticism and activism concerning the Court's
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's restrictions on eminent domain. The
Court's approval of the government's taking and subsequent selling of a middle
class individual's non-blighted property to a private developer awakened a sleeping
giant that has long lain within the settled federal interpretation of what constitutes
a legitimate public use. Strong opposition and disapproval of Kelo, unlike other
issues in today's bitterly divided America, has drawn together a diverse coalition
of national leaders.
While part of the wave of public outrage is simple criticism of the Court's
concept of what constitutes a public use, the more significant public reaction
involves uncertainty of whether the laws of the individual states would permit a
Kelo-style use of eminent domain. South Carolina Supreme Court precedent
suggests that an "economic development" taking would violate the South Carolina
Constitution.2 However, many in South Carolina believe property rights need
greater protections to foreclose the possibility that a Kelo-style taking might occur
While there is no immediate danger that Kelo-type takings will occur in South
Carolina, there is always the remote chance that the South Carolina Supreme Court
may overrule its own precedent or a local government may abuse its powers to
condemn private property.
Despite this remote chance, individuals who wish to ensure maximum
protection from eminent domain abuse do have some options. Concerned citizens
could lobby the South Carolina General Assembly to do three things. First, the
General Assembly could propose an amendment to the South Carolina Constitution
to prohibit takings for economic development purposes. Second, the General
Assembly could clarify the vague statute that defines blight. Third, the General
Assembly could pass legislation providing property owners a statutory right to
repurchase their property if the government abandons its initial public use and
attempts to utilize the land for a non-public use.

1. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
2. See Ga. Dep't of Transp. v. Jasper County, 355 S.C. 631, 639, 586 S.E.2d 853, 857 (2003)
(holding a proposed marine terminal "does not meet [the] restrictive definition of public use" because
the general public would not have the right of public access to the marine terminal and profits from the
terminal would primarily benefit the private developer); Karesh v. City Council of Charleston, 271 S.C.
339, 344-45, 247 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1978) (holding the City of Charleston could not use the power of
eminent domain to build a convention center-hotel complex because the plan would primarily benefit
the private developer and would only negligibly be a public use).
3. Neil Mellen, Private Property in Post-Kelo South Carolina, SOUTH CAROLINA POLICY
COUNCIL 1 (2005), http://scpolicycouncil.com/publications/32.pdf.
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Another concern landowners have is the effect of the presumption in favor of
the condemning authority when landowners challenge condemnation." To overcome
this difficulty, individuals troubled by this barrier could urge the General Assembly
to statutorily eliminate the presumption. The General Assembly could require the
condemning authority to prove two things with reasonable certainty: (1) the
necessity of the taking and (2) that the land taken would be used to satisfy that
necessity. Although these solutions may protect against the small number of
potential vulnerabilities inherent in South Carolina eminent domain law, none of
the vulnerabilities should create a fear of rampant Kelo-style takings in South
Carolina.
This Note examines the greater protections South Carolina law provides for
landowners from the use of eminent domain powers for economic development
takings than federal law. However, this Note argues that while South Carolina law
provides adequate protections from the use of eminent domain for economic
development, the use of eminent domain is still vulnerable to abuses in other areas.
Part II outlines the development of the federal public use law. Part III examines the
Kelo decision. Part IV looks at the strong public opposition to the Kelo Court's
decision and the predictability of the outcome based on precedent. Part V examines
the development of a strict public use standard in South Carolina and explains why
economic development takings are unlikely to occur in this state. Finally, Part VI
looks at three potential vulnerabilities in South Carolina eminent domain law South
Carolinians should urge their legislators to scrutinize rather than pursuing
legislation to combat Kelo-style takings.
II.

THE FEDERAL PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT BEFORE KELO

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." 5 While the
Fifth Amendment safeguards against arbitrary government takings, it also expressly
permits the government to take private property without the owner's consent. At the
time of the nation's founding, this was not a new governmental power. Both the
Old Testament and Greek literature contain references to the government's ability
to take private lands. 6 In 1625, Hugo Grotius, the Dutch jurist, first ascribed the
name dominium eminens (eminent domain) to this power.7 The Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause is not a grant of eminent domain power to the government but
rather a restriction placed on the government's inherent power to take private
property.8

4. See Timmons v. S.C. Tricentennial Comm'n, 254 S.C. 378, 396, 175 S.E.2d 805, 814 (1970)
("Whether there is a necessity, a permanent taking or a public use are primarily legislative questions,
and there is a presumption that the use contemplated is a necessary, permanent and public one.").
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. Stephen S. Boynton, Note, Components of Eminent Domain: An Ancient Tool for
Contemporary Use, 15 S.C. L. REv. 943,944 n.4 (1963).
7. Id. at 944-45.
8. See id. at 945-46.
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Because the federal government utilizes the power less frequently than local
and state governments, eminent domain case law only began to develop when the
United States Supreme Court found the requirements of the Takings Clause
essential to the guarantee of due process found in the Fourteenth Amendment. 9
Thus, case law defining what constituted a valid public use developed when the
Court aligned the Takings Clause with the Fourteenth Amendment-forcing the
states to comply with its requirements.
A. Berman v. Parker
The recent controversy surrounding eminent domain focuses primarily on the
Fifth Amendment's requirement that the government take private property only for
a public use.'" To determine what constitutes a public use, the United States
Supreme Court has consistently applied a standard of review deferential to the
condemning authority. In Berman v. Parker," the Court stated the judiciary's role
in determining whether a condemning authority's action met the public use test is
"an extremely narrow one."'" The Court further stated that "the legislature, not the
judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social
legislation."' 3 Additionally, the Court concluded, "Once the question of public
purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken. . rests in
the discretion of the legislative branch."' 4 To satisfy the federal public use
requirement of the Fifth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court requires that
the taking fulfill a public purpose or benefit, rather than the more restrictive view
that the public actually "use" the land. 5
Berman involved a department store owner in the District of Columbia who
challenged the constitutionality of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act,
which included a provision taking his non-blighted land in a blighted area of
town.' 6 The plaintiff argued the District of Columbia did not have the authority to

9. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
10. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231-32 (2003) ("[T]he text of the Fifth
Amendment imposes two conditions on the exercise of such authority: the taking must be for a 'public
use' and 'just compensation' must be paid to the owner.").
11. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
12. Id. at 32.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 35-36.
15. See Rindge Co. v. County of L.A., 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923) (stating to be a valid public use,
"[i]t is not essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion, should directly enjoy
or participate in any improvement" (citing Falibrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161-62
(1896))).
16. Bennan, 348 U.S. at 31. The Court did not define blight but pointed to the language of the act
that authorized the redevelopment and which defined substandard housing as "'any dwelling ...for
human beings, which because of lack of sanitary facilities, ventilation, or light, or because of
dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty interior arrangement or any combination of these factors,
is . . .detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the inhabitants of the District of
Columbia."' Id. at 28 n.1 (quoting District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, ch. 736, § 3(r),
60 Stat. 790, 792 (1946), invalidatedby Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)).
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condemn non-blighted land under a redevelopment plan. 7 The Court approved the
taking and recognized "there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the
way" of a redevelopment plan with the goal of making areas within the District of
Columbia "beautiful as well as sanitary."' 8 As to the plaintiffs argument that his
land was not blighted, the Court stated that "[p]roperty may of course be taken for
this redevelopment which, standing by itself, is innocuous and unoffending .... [I]t
is the need of the area as a whole which Congress and its agencies are evaluating."' 9
The Court further noted that "[t]he public end may be as well or better served
through an agency of private enterprise than through a department of
government."'2 Thus, the Court held the Fifth Amendment placed no restriction on
the condemning authority's ability to take non-blighted property as part of a
redevelopment plan.2
B. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Middff,22 the Court expanded the public use
requirement. In Midkzff, a small group of landowners challenged the
constitutionality of the Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967.23 This group of
individuals owned a substantial amount of the land in Hawaii; the Hawaii
legislature passed the Land Reform Act to specifically break up their monopoly of
the housing market.24 Through the Act, the Hawaii legislature set up a
condemnation scheme to transfer ownership to the current tenants living on the
condemned land.2 Consequently, the landowners would lose their stronghold on
the Hawaii housing market. The Court analyzed whether the Act was a
constitutional use of the state's eminent domain power.26 In its discussion of the
definition of public use, the Court reaffirmed its deferential position to the
condemning authority and stated that it "will not substitute its judgment for a
legislature's judgment as to what constitutes a public use 'unless the use be
palpably without reasonable foundation. "27 The Court seemed unmoved by the fact
that this use of eminent domain involved the state's redistribution of land from one
private individual to another private individual. The Court stated:
The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is
transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954).
Id. at33.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 35-36.
467 U.S. 229 (1984).
Id. at 233-35.
Id. at 233.

25. Id.
26. Id. at 239-41.
27. Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
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condemn that taking as having only a private purpose.... [The]
government does not itself have to use property to legitimate the
taking; it is only the taking's purpose, and not its mechanics, that
must pass scrutiny under the Public Use Clause.28
The Court determined that "'whether in fact the provision will accomplish its
objectives is not the question: the [constitutional requirement] is satisfied
if... the... [state] Legislature rationallycould have believed that the [Act] would
promote its objective."' 29 In other words, when a landowner challenges the
government's use of eminent domain, the state carries no burden to prove the
government will accomplish the intended public use but only that it is rational for
the government to believe that it will accomplish that use. The Court concluded that
"attack[ing] certain perceived evils of concentrated property ownership" was "a
legitimate public purpose."3
By its decision in Midkiff, the Supreme Court firmly established the standard
regarding what constitutes a public use. Due to the amount of deference given to
a legislature's judgment, the only real restraint the Court seems to rigidly uphold
involves a "purely private taking" that "would serve no legitimate purpose of
government and would thus be void."'" Otherwise, as long as some public benefit
results from the project, the Court is likely to approve the exercise of the power of
eminent domain. Moreover, under this standard, the Court is likely to uphold any
legislative determination of public benefit--especially considering the Court's
highly deferential standard of the exercise of eminent domain.
III. KELO V. CITY OFNEWLONDON: A BROAD PUBLIC USE STANDARD

Kelo v. City of New London 2 pitted a group of middle-class homeowners
against the New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a corporation
dedicated to the economic development of the City of New London, Connecticut. a
The City Council of New London charged the NLDC with the responsibility of
designing and implementing a plan of economic development for the city.34 The
city council also granted the corporation the power to purchase property and the
ability to use eminent domain to achieve the economic development.3" The NLDC's

28.
29.
451 U.S.
30.

Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243-44 (1984).
Id. at 242 (alterations in original) (quoting W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
648, 671-72 (1981)).
Id at 245.

31. Id. at 245.

32. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
33. Id. at 2568-60.
34. Id. at 2569; see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-188 (2001).
35. Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2660; see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-193 (2001).
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board members were unelected and privately appointed,36 but were required to seek
the approval from the city council to use eminent domain.37

The redevelopment plan aimed to reverse the long economic decline of the city,
which a Connecticut state agency declared in 1990 to be a "'distressed
3 The NLDC also sought to improve the city's unemployment rate,
municipality.""'
which was twice the state's average in 1998. 39 The plan called for the construction
of a hotel, an urban village, research office facilities, a museum, residential
housing, and a marina.'0 The NLDC planned these new developments to
complement the construction of a new $300 million Pfizer research facility in the
same area." Referring to the potential benefits, Justice Stevens noted that "[i]n
addition to creating jobs, generating tax revenue, and helping to 'build momentum
for the revitalization of downtown New London,' the plan was also designed to
make the City more attractive and to create leisure and recreational opportunities
on the waterfront and in the park." 2
To construct the new downtown area in New London, the NLDC had to acquire
115 privately owned properties."3 The plan would re-divide these properties into
seven parcels.' The NLDC easily purchased most of the homes in the area but met
resistance from Susette Kelo and eight other property owners unwilling to sell their
land."5 The properties in dispute were within two parcels of the proposed plan.' On
one parcel, the NLDC proposed building research and office space, and, on the
other parcel, the NLDC proposed building "park support" or parking. 7 The
property owners refused to sell not because they wished to receive more
compensation or because they opposed the revitalization of the area but rather
because they believed that economic development did not constitute a valid public
use."' The property owners did not want to leave the homes that they had resided
in for years. For example, one homeowner, Wilhelmina Dery, had lived in her
house since her birth in 1918." Eventually arriving at an impasse, the parties took
their dispute to court, and the case made its way to the United States Supreme
Court.
A.

The United States Supreme Court'sAnalysis

36. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
37. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-193.
38. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658-59 (majority opinion).
39. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005).
40. Id. at 2659.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting 2 Joint Appendix at 92, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.
Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108)).
43. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
44. Id.
45. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2660 (2005).
46. Id. at 2660.
47. Id. at 2671-72 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 2672.
49. Id. at 2660 (majority opinion).
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In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court sided with the City of New
London, holding that economic development constituted a public use within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment.5" The Court agreed with the property owners that
"the City would no doubt be forbidden from taking petitioners' land for the purpose
of conferring a private benefit on a particular private party."51 However, the Court
stated, "[T]he City's development plan was not adopted 'to benefit a particular class
of identifiable individuals."' 52 The Court specifically addressed the issue that the
land may end up in private hands:
[W]hile the City intends to transfer certain of the parcels to a
private developer in a long-term lease-which developer, in turn,
is expected to lease the office space and so forth to other private
tenants-the identities of those private parties were not known
when the plan was adopted. It is, of course, difficult to accuse the
government of having taken A's property to benefit the private
interests of B when the identity of B was unknown.53
Next, the Court reaffirmed that it "'long ago rejected any literal requirement
that condemned property be put into use for the general public' and "embraced the
broader and more natural interpretation of public use as 'public purpose. '"54 Thus,
following precedent, the Court concluded this case turned on "whether the City's
development plan serve[d] a 'public purpose."55
In determining whether a public purpose existed, the Court analyzed the City
of New London's development plan using the reasoning of Berman and Midlaff.56
First, the majority pointed out that the Berman Court "refused to evaluate [the]
claim in isolation, deferring instead to the legislative and agency judgment that the
area 'must be planned as a whole' for the plan to be successful. 5 7 Also, the
majority quoted the Berman Court's assertion that "'community redevelopment
programs need not, by force of the Constitution, be on a piecemeal basis-lot by
lot, building by building."'"8 The only vital difference between the alleged public
purpose in Berman and the alleged public purpose in Kelo was that Berman
involved slum clearance, while Kelo involved economic development. Therefore,
if the Court found that economic development was an acceptable public purpose,
the Court would apply its Berman precedent to the Kelo situation.

50. Id.at 2668.
51. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2661 (2005).
52. Id. at 2662 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)).
53. Id. at 2661-62 n.6.
54. Id. at 2662 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244).
55. Id. at 2663.
56. Id. at 2663-64.
57. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2663 (2005) (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 34 (1954)).
58. Id.(quoting Bernan, 348 U.S. at 35).
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The majority also discussed the Midkiff Court's holding-"'[I]t is only the
taking's purpose, and not its mechanics,' ...

that matters in determining public

use" 59-to determine what constitutes a public purpose. The MidkiffCourt "rejected
the contention that the mere fact that the State immediately transferred the
properties to private individuals upon condemnation somehow diminished the
public character of the taking."6 Thus, according to Midkiff, as long as the taking
served a public purpose, the fact that the land transferred from one private
individual to another private individual was irrelevant.
In both Berman and Midkiff,the Court avoided determining whether something
constituted a true public use by giving broad deference to the legislature. The
majority in Kelo noted, "For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has
wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording
legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the
takings power."'" The Court concluded the city's "determination that the area was
sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation [was] entitled
to their deference."6 2 Lastly, the Court stated:
Given the comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough
deliberation that preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of
our review, it is appropriate for us, as it was in Berman, to resolve
the challenges of the individual owners, not on a piecemeal basis,
but rather in light of the entire plan. Because that plan
unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings challenged
here satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.63
The Court refused to adopt a bright-line rule that economic development does
not constitute a public purpose because "[p]romoting economic development is a
traditional and long accepted function of government."' The Court supported its
position by stating there was "no principled way of distinguishing economic
development from the other public purposes that [it has] recognized .... [and it]

would be incongruous to hold that the City's interest in the economic benefits to be
derived from the development of the.., area has less of a public character than any
of those other interests."'65 The Court rejected the contention that this case amounted
to a private taking because "the government's pursuit of a public purpose will often
benefit individual private parties..... 'We cannot say that public ownership is the
sole method of promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment
projects."'"

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 2664 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984)).
Id. at 2664.
Id.
Id. at 2665.
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005).
Id.

65. Id.
66. Id. at 2666 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34 (1954)).
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The property owners also urged the Court to adopt a test requiring the
government to demonstrate "a 'reasonable certainty' that the expected public
'
benefits will actually accrue."67
The property owners argued that in order to take
away one's fundamental right to own property, the government should have clearly
defined reasons for needing the land. For example, the property owners were not
satisfied with the government's reasons for needing the land because the NLDC
was hardly confident in its proposed use for one of the parcels when questioned by
the Court.68 However, the majority stuck to precedent and reaffirmed the principle
that if "'the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not
irrational,... empirical debates over the wisdom of takings-no less than debates
over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation-are not to be carried
out in the federal courts.'" 69 The majority argued that such a test would result in bad
public policy because "[a] constitutional rule that required postponement of the
judicial approval of every condemnation until the likelihood of success of the plan
had been assured would unquestionably impose a significant impediment to the
successful consummation ofmany such plans."70 In the end, the Court did not adopt
the property owners' proposed reasonable certainty test for two reasons: first, the
Court disagreed with the contention that this case was distinguishable from Berman
and Midkiff, and second, the Court continues to believe that legislatures should
determine what constitutes a public use. 7
Justice Kennedy provided the swing vote in favor of the result but disagreed
with the majority concerning the landowner's proposed reasonable certainty test.72
Although he did not call for the implementation of the reasonable certainty test in
Kelo, Justice Kennedy suggested that "a more stringent standard of review than that
announced in Berman and Midkiffmight be appropriate for a more narrowly drawn
category of takings. 73 In a case involving economic benefits, Justice Kennedy
stated a court must examine the stated public purpose and determine whether the
benefits to the public are incidental to the benefits to private developers. 74 He also
noted that "[a] court confronted with a plausible accusation of impermissible
favoritism to private parties should treat the objection as a serious one and review
the record to see if it has merit, though with the presumption that the government's
actions were reasonable and intended to serve a public purpose., 75 "Even the
dissenting justices on the Connecticut Supreme Court," Justice Kennedy stated,
"agreed that respondents' development plan was intended to revitalize the local

67. Id. at 2667.
68. Id. at 2672 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 35-37, Kelo v.
City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108)).
69. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2667 (2005) (majority opinion) (quoting Haw.
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1984)).
70. Id. at 2668.
71. Id. at 2667-68.
72. Id. at 2669-70 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 2670.
74. Id. at 2669.
75. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2669 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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economy, not to serve the interests of... any other private party persuasive."76
Thus, while Justice Kennedy stated that "[t]his [was] not the occasion for
conjecture as to what sort of cases might justify a more demanding standard,"" he
left open the possibility that such a class of cases exists.
B. Justice O'Connor: DistinguishingBerman and Midkiff
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor-joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas-proclaimed that "[u]nder the banner of economic
development, all private property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred
to another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded."78 She found that the
majority's reasoning had "effectively... delete[d] the words 'for public use' from
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment"79 and that "[t]he specter of
condemnation hangs over all property."" Thus, on the question of whether
economic development takings
are constitutional, Justice O'Connor stated, "I
8' l
would hold that they are not.
In reaching this conclusion, Justice O'Connor first had to distinguish Berman
and Midkifffrom Kelo. Important to the distinction was the fact that in Berman and
Midkiff
the extraordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted property
inflicted affirmative harm on society-in Berman through blight
resulting from extreme poverty and in Midkiffthrough oligopoly
resulting from extreme wealth.... Thus a public purpose was
realized when the harmful use was eliminated. Because each
taking directly achieved a public benefit, it did not matter that the
property was turned over to private use.82
Justice O'Connor thus concluded that Berman and Midldff"endorsed government
intervention when private property use had veered to such an extreme that the
public was suffering as a consequence." 83 She explained that extending the meaning
of "public use" to fit the facts in Kelo would effectively allow anything to qualify
as a public use." She stated, "[I]f predicted (or even guaranteed) positive sideeffects are enough to render transfer from one private party to another
constitutional, then the words 'for public use' do not realistically exclude any

76. Id. at 2670 (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 595 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

79. Id.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 2676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2673 (2005).
Id. at 2674.
Id. at 2677.
Id. at 2675.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol57/iss3/7

10

Howsare: Kelo in South Carolina: Economic Development Is Not a Public Use

2006]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

85
takings, and thus do not exert any constraint on the eminent domain power.
Justice O'Connor then concluded that "[n]othing is to prevent the State from
replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any
farm with a factory." 6
Lastly, Justice O'Connor made a public policy argument that "the fallout from
this decision will not be random"' and that "[t]he beneficiaries are likely to be
those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process,
including large corporations and development firms. As for the victims, the
government now has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources
to those with more."88 Justice O'Connor asserted that economic development
takings, by their nature, target low-income areas where the property is cheaper for
developers to acquire. 9 She concluded these types of takings'are unjust and "[t]he
Founders cannot have intended this perverse result."'

C. Justice Thomas: Advocating a LiteralPublic Use Standard
Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissent and concluded the majority's public
purpose interpretation of the Public Use Clause is inconsistent with the Framer's
intent and that the Court should restore a literal reading of the words "public use."'"
As to the long history of cases in support of the public purpose test employed by
the majority, Justice Thomas stated, "I would reconsider them."92 He believed
"[t]he most natural reading of the [Takings] Clause is that it allows the government
to take property only if the government owns, or the public has a legal right to use,
the property, as opposed to taking it for any public purpose or necessity
whatsoever."93 Thus, Justice Thomas stated that "[w]hen the government takes
property and gives it to a private individual, and the public has no right to use the
property, it strains language to say that the public is 'employing' the property,
regardless
of the incidental benefits that might accrue to the public from the private
94
use."

Criticizing the Court's deference to state legislatures, Justice Thomas asked
why the Court deferred to this public use determination but,"would not defer to a
legislature's determination of the various circumstances that establish ... when a
search of a home would be reasonable."" Contrasting the heightened review of
Fourth Amendment search cases with the majority's deferential review for eminent

85. Id.
86. Id. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
87. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2676, 2677 (2005).

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2676.
Id. at 2677-78 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 2678.
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2679 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2684.
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domain, Justice Thomas concluded, "Though citizens are safe from the government

in their homes, the homes themselves are not."" He then addressed the majority's
reluctance to second-guess the legislature:
I share the Court's skepticism about a public use standard that
requires courts to second-guess the policy wisdom of public
works projects. The "public purpose" standard this Court has
adopted, however, demands the use of such judgment, for the
Court concedes97 that the Public Use Clause would forbid a purely
private taking.
Thus, Justice Thomas believed strict adherence to the public use requirement would
allow courts to avoid second-guessing legislatures. Determining whether a taking
meets the public use requirement would be a less fact-intensive, more clear-cut
inquiry-whether the land goes directly into private hands or not-than the
majority's application of the public purpose standard.
Justice Thomas also put forth a public policy argument similar to Justice
O'Connor's policy argument regarding those individuals the Court's decision will
likely affect. He stated, "Ifever there were justification for intrusive judicial review
of constitutional provisions that protect 'discrete and insular minorities,' surely that
principle would apply with great force to the powerless groups and individuals the
Public Use Clause protects." 8 Justice Thomas then concluded that "the predictable
consequence of the Court's decision will be to exacerbate these effects.""
Justice Thomas asserted that "[w]hen faced with a clash of constitutional
principle and a line of unreasoned cases wholly divorced from the text, history, and
structure of our founding document, we should not hesitate to resolve the tension
in favor of the Constitution's original meaning."100 "If such 'economic
development' takings are for a 'public use,' any taking is," Justice Thomas stated,
"and the Court has erased the Public Use Clause from our Constitution."' 0'
IV. LIMIrrED LEGAL CONSEQUENCES,
FOLLOWING KELO

BUT AN ENORMOUS PUBLIC OUTCRY

Kelo undoubtedly changed one thing concerning the Court's eminent domain
jurisprudence: economic development is now a public use within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment. Although the Court had previously approved takings for

96.
97.
98.
304 U.S.
99.

Id. at 2685.
Id. at 2686 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2687 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
144, 153 n.4 (1938)).
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2687 (2005).

100. Id.
101. Id. at 2678.
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slum-clearance 0 2 and breaking up a land oligopoly, 3 it had never decided any
takings cases purely dealing with economic development. However, when
considering precedent, it seems that any other conclusion would have been difficult
to reach. Precedent supports the Court's deferential standard. Once the Court
determines that a land use plan-clearing a slum, building a road, constructing a
hospital, or creating a park-serves a public purpose, "the means of executing the
project are for [the legislature] and [the legislature] alone to determine. ' ' °
Furthermore, the Court stated that "it will not substitute its judgment for a
legislature's judgment as to what constitutes a public use 'unless the use be
palpably without reasonable foundation.' 10' 5 Lastly, the Court emphasized that
"'whether infact the [plan] will accomplish its objectives is not the question: the
[constitutional requirement] is satisfied if... the ...[state] Legislature rationally
could have believed that the [plan] would promote its objective.'""06 Thus, the Court
logically found that economic development pursuant to a redevelopment plan in a
"distressed municipality"'0 7 served a public purpose.
Despite the logic in the Court's result based on the relevant precedent, waves
of criticism coming from the political left and right broke immediately following
the Kelo decision. The United States House of Representatives adopted "a highly
unusual," but mostly meaningless, resolution criticizing the Kelo ruling by a
lopsided vote of 365 to 3318 The House also passed the Private Property Rights
Protection Act of 2005 that prohibits the allocation of federal economic
development funds to any state that exercises its power of eminent domain for
economic development." ° Republican Senator John Comyn of Texas introduced
a bill with bipartisan support called the Protection of Homes, Small Businesses and
Private Property Act of 2005."' Senator Comyn's bill excludes economic
development from the concept of public use. "' Similar bills will likely flood federal
and state legislatures because many Americans are passionate about finding a way
to stop Kelo-type uses of eminent domain.
Perhaps the most egregious and underreported development after Kelo was the
initiation of eviction proceedings brought by the City of New London and the

102. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
103. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
104. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.
105. Midlaff, 467 U.S. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668,
680 (1896)).
106. Id. at 242 (quoting W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671-72

(1981)).
107. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005).
108. Kenneth R. Harney, Eminent Domain Ruling Has Strong Repercussions, WASH. POST, July
23, 2005, at FOI; H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong. (2005).
109. Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (2005).
110. Protection of Homes, Small Businesses, and Private Property Act of 2005, S.1313, 109th
Cong. (2005).
111. Id.
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2
NLDC against Susette Kelo and the other homeowners involved in the Kelo suit."1
In addition to eviction notices, the NLDC charged them "'use and occupancy' fees"
for the years they lived in their homes while the courts considered the case." 3
Aggravating developments like this, along with the general panic and fear of having
property condemned, may spur many politicians in federal and state legislatures to
propose legislation attempting to limit the Court's ruling. These bills will probably
gain bipartisan support because of the collective concern shared by those on the left
and the right.
For many, this leads not to the question of whether South Carolina should
protect its citizens from these types of takings, but how South Carolina can protect
its citizens from eminent domain abuse. As far as Kelo-style takings are concerned,
the South Carolina Supreme Court has twice ruled that takings where property
transfers from one private property owner to another do not constitute a valid use.' '
Furthermore, the South Carolina Supreme Court interprets the "public use"
requirement in a strict sense, similar to Justice Thomas's interpretation in Kelo. '
Although the Federal Takings Clause may not provide this type of extra protection,
it is within the power of every state to provide its own citizens with more individual
protections than the federal government." 6 Although South Carolina provides
protection from Kelo-type takings, this state's eminent domain laws are still
vulnerable to misuse in many areas.

V. SOUTH CAROLINA: STRONG PROTECTIONS AGAINST A KELO-STYLE TAKING

A. Eminent Domain Priorto the Takings Clause
Prior to the 1868 South Carolina Constitution, no state constitutional provision
addressed just compensation in the event of the government's exercise of its
eminent domain power.'"' Rather, the government utilized its inherent authority to
seize lands for public use. For example, in Lindsay v. Commissioners,"8 the South
Carolina Constitutional Court of Appeals held, "'Every freeholder, holding lands

112. Editorial, House Party,INVESTOR's Bus. DAILY, Aug. 24, 2005, at A14. The NLDC argues
the homeowners have been living on city property since 2000, the year the NLDC condemned the
properties, and therefore owe rent for the time they lived there. Id. According to the Investor's Business
Daily report, the NLDC determined one homeowner owed more than $300,000 and Susette Kelo owed

$57,000. Id. Also, the NLDC is attempting to collect any rent the homeowners collected from tenants
who rented their properties after their condemnation. Id.
113. Joyce Howard Price, Losers in Eminent Domain Case FaceHefly Fees, WASH. TIMEs, Sept.

20, 2005, at A03.
114. See Ga. Dep't. of Transp. v. Jasper County, 355 S.C. 631, 638-39, 586 S.E.2d 853, 856-57
(2003); Karesh v. City Council of Charleston, 271 S.C. 339, 344-45, 247 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1978).

115. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2675 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
116. See id. at 2668 (majority opinion) ("[Miany States already impose 'public use' requirements
that are stricter than the federal baseline.").
117. See City of Spartanburg v. Belk's Dep't Store of Clinton, 199 S.C. 458, 471, 20 S.E.2d 157,
163 (1942).
118. 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38 (S.C. Const. App. 1796).
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under the state, holds them upon condition of yielding a portion of them, when
20
wanted for the public roads and highways.'.. 9 In State v. Dawson,1
the South
Carolina Court of Appeals reaffirmed Lindsay:
"[T]here is a tacit reservation in every grant of a freehold of so
much as may be necessary for the ordinary purposes of making
roads and highways; and as a part of the eminent domain, the
Legislature has a right to set
it apart for that use, when the public
2
convenience requires it.' '
The Dawson court also determined that it was the well-settled law of the state "that
the Legislature had the power to order roads to be opened, and to use so much
timber, earth, or rock, as [is] necessary to keep the road in repair; and to do this
' 22
contrary to the will of the owner, and without making previous compensation.' 23
However, South Carolina added a takings clause to its 1868 state constitution.1
Like the United States Constitution's Taking Clause, South Carolina's version
allows the government to taking land only for public use and requires the
government to provide just compensation. 24
B.

The Development of the Modern Public Use Requirement in South
Carolina

Following South Carolina's adoption of a takings clause in its state
constitution, the South Carolina Supreme Court has consistently utilized a narrow
or literal interpretation of public use. 21 South Carolina's interpretation is truly
unique. One commentator recognized that "only one state, South Carolina, requires
property taken through eminent domain literally to be used or occupied by the
public to satisfy the public use requirement."'2 6 Some commentators believe "that
the people of South Carolina need not worry."'2 7 Others believe further guarantees
that a Kelo-style taking will never occur are needed. These individuals do not plan

119. Id. (quoting Lindsay, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) at 38).
120. 21 S.C.L. (3 Hill ) 100 (S.C. App. 1836).
121. Dawson, 21 S.C.L. (3 Hill) at 105 (quoting Eaves v. Terry, 15 S.C.L. (4 McCord) 125, 127

(S.C. App. 1827)).
122. Id. at 102.
123. See Belk's Dep't Store, 199 S.C. at 471, 20 S.E.2d at 163.
124. S.C. CoNST. art. I, § 13 ("Private property shall not be taken for private use without the
consent of the owner, nor for public use without just compensation being first made therefor.").
125. See, e.g., Riley v. Charleston Union Station Co., 71 S.C. 457, 485, 51 S.E. 485, 496 (1905)
("Some cases take the very broad view that 'public use' is synonymous with 'public benefit.' A more
restricted view, however, would seem to better comport with the due protection of private property
against spoliation under the guise of eminent domain.").
126. Elizabeth F. Gallagher, Breaking New Ground: Using Eminent Domain for Economic
Development, 73 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1837, 1841 (2005).
127. Mellen, supra note 3, at 3.
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on "[p]lacing [their] long term faith and hope in South Carolina's State Supreme
'2
Court."'

The Federal Takings Clause simply states that "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.' ' 9 The South Carolina takings
clause, however, expressly provides that "private property shall not be taken for
private use without the consent of the owner, nor for public use without just
compensation being first made therefor."'"3 The difference in language provides
support for South Carolina's greater individual protections.
The seminal case in South Carolina regarding the public use doctrine is Riley
v. Charleston Union Station Co.' Riley involved a railroad company, organized
under an act of the General Assembl,y that possessed the power of eminent
domain. 3 2 The company wished to use its eminent domain power to condemn an
area of land to build a train station.'33 The South Carolina Supreme Court stated that
"[a] more restrictive view [of the public use clause] would seem to better comport
with the due protection of private property against spoliation under the guise of
eminent domain."' 34 The supreme court reasoned that to qualify as a public use,
"the public must have a definite and fixed use of the property to be condemned,
independent of the will of the person or corporation taking title under
condemnation."' 35 The court then held that because "[t]he public.., has a fixed and
definite right to use this station," the public use requirement for this taking was
satisfied. 36
In Edens v. City of Columbia,'37 decided two years after the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Berman, the South Carolina Supreme Court made
several important distinctions between South Carolina public use law and the law
of other jurisdictions. Edens involved a plan to use eminent domain to acquire a
"blighted" area in downtown Columbia, South Carolina and resell most of this land
to private developers. 3 ' In striking down this proposed public use, the supreme
court stated that while "in... other states the power of eminent domain may be
exercised for a public purpose, benefit, or the public welfare," our constitution
requires a taking to be for a public use. 39 The court also chose not to adopt the
lesser "public purpose" requirement utilized by the United States Supreme Court,
holding that "[p]ublic benefit and public use are not synonymous in the better and

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 7 (emphasis removed).
U.S. CONST. art. V.
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13.
71 S.C. 457, 51 S.E. 485 (1905).
Id. at 484, 51 S.E. at 495.
Id. at 484, 51 S.E. at 495.
Id. at 485, 51 S.E. at 496.

135. Id. at 486, 51 S.E. at 496.
136. Id. at 486, 51 S.E. at 496.
137. 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956).
138. Id. at 567, 91 S.E.2 at 280-81.

139. Id. at 570, 91 S.E.2d at 282.
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more clearly constitutional view. We think that the latter (public use)
is necessary
4
for the constitutional exercise of the power of eminent domain."1 0
In Karesh v. City Council of Charleston, 41 the City of Charleston planned to
condemn land and enter into a deal with a private developer to build a hotel,
department store, convention center, and parking garage that would be open to the
public. 42 The supreme court again emphasized that "[w]hile in other jurisdictions
the power of eminent domain may be exercised for a public purpose, benefit or the
public welfare, the courts of South Carolina have adhered to a strict interpretation
of our constitutional provision.' ' 43 In describing this requirement the court stated
that "'[m]ere benefit to the public or permission by the owner for use of the
property by the public are not enough to constitute a public use, but it must appear
that the public has an enforceable right to a definite and fixed use of the
property."' " As opposed to the deference afforded to the legislature by the federal
courts, South Carolina law dictates that "[w]hat constitutes a public use is
ultimately a judicial question."' 4 However, the Karesh court conceded that "the
term [public use] is an elastic one in order to keep abreast of changing social
conditions, and presents a question of fact in each particular case."'"
In deciding the city's proposed plan was not a public use, the court held: "We
believe the proposed plan would allow the City to join hands with a developer and
undertake a project primarily of benefit to the developer, with no assurance of more
than negligible advantage to the general public."' 47 Referring to the city's claims
that the project was highly desirable, the court stated that "however desirable the
project [was] from a municipal planning viewpoint, the use of the power of eminent
domain for such purposes runs squarely into the right of an individual to own
property and use it as he pleases."' 4 Because the proposed plan would give almost
exclusive control to the private developer, the court concluded that "[t]he guarantee
that the public will enjoy the use of the facilities, so necessary to the public use
concept, [was] absent."' 49
In Goldbergv. City Council of Charleston,the South Carolina Supreme Court
determined the city council "removed the constitutional impediments" present in
Karesh.5 ° In Goldberg,the court approved a modified version of the plan disputed

140. Id. at 573, 91 S.E.2d at 283 (quoting Bookhart v. Cent. Elec. Power Coop., 219 S.C. 414,
431, 65 S.E.2d 781, 788 (1951)).
141. 271 S.C. 339, 247 S.E.2d 342 (1978).
142. Id. at 341, 247 S.E.2d at 343.
143. Id. at 342, 247 S.E.2d at 344.
144. Id. at 344, 247 S.E.2d at 345 (quoting Tuomey Hosp. v. City of Sumter, 243 S.C. 544, 551,
134 S.E.2d 744, 747 (1964)).
145. Id. at 342,247 S.E.2d at 344 (citing Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563,576, 91 S.E.2d
280, 285 (1956)).
146. Id. at 342, 247 S.E.2d at 344.
147. Karesh v. City Council of Charleston, 271 S.C. 339, 343, 247 S.E.2d 342, 344 (1978).
148. Id. at 344-45, 247 S.E.2d at 345.
149. Id. at 344, 247 S.E.2d at 345.
150. Goldberg v. City Council of Charleston, 273 S.C. 140, 141, 254 S.E.2d 803, 804 (1979).
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one year earlier in Karesh as an acceptable public use.'51 The court's approval of
the condemnation in Goldberg turned on the fact that the city would own and
operate the parking garage as opposed to leasing it to the private developer. 2 In
approving the proposed use, the court held:
The constitutional vice of a municipal corporation joining hands
with a private developer to undertake a project primarily of
benefit to the developer is not present in this project. By retaining
exclusive ownership and control over the parking facility the City
Council has simultaneously avoided both the joining of hands
with a private developer and the undertaking of a project
primarily of benefit to a private developer. The fact that business
patrons of the private developer, as members of the general
public, will also possess the enforceable right to use the parking
facility does not defeat the constitutional validity ofthis project.5 3
Thus, the city council "fully complied with the requirements of the constitution" by
retaining ownership of the parking facility.5 4
In 2003, the South Carolina Supreme Court decided Georgia Departmentof
Transportation v. Jasper County, the most recent public use case in South
Carolina.' 55 Jasper County attempted to condemn land along the South Carolina
side of the Savannah River, which the Georgia Department of Transportation used
for dredging activities.' 56 Jasper County intended to lease most of the condemned
land to a private developer for a period of ninety-nine years, and, in return, the
developer would construct a maritime terminal along the river.'57 Jasper County
argued that the maritime terminal would serve a public purpose because of the
economic benefits it would bring to the area. 5 Specifically, the proposed project
would be valued at $400 million when completed-accounting 59for forty percent of
the county's tax base-and diversify the county's job market.
In response to the economic benefits argument, the court stated that "[a] Ithough
the projected economic benefit to [the] County is very attractive, it cannot justify
condemnation."' 60 Furthermore, the court emphasized that
"[t]he public use implies possession, occupation, and enjoyment
of the land by the public at large or by public agencies; and the

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 142, 254 S.E.2d at 804.
Id. at 141, 254 S.E.2d at 804.
Id. at 141-42, 254 S.E.2d at 804.
Id. at 142, 254 S.E.2d at 804.
Ga. Dep't ofTransp. v. Jasper County, 355 S.C. 631, 586 S.E.2d 853 (2003).
Id. at 633, 586 S.E.2d at 854.
Id. at 633-34, 586 S.E.2d at 854.
Id. at 637, 586 S.E.2d at 856.
Id. at 637, 586 S.E.2d at 856.
Id. at 638, 586 S.E.2d at 856.
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due protection of the rights of private property will preclude the
government from seizing it in the hands of the owner, and turning
it over to another on vague grounds of public benefit to spring
'6
from a more profitable use to which the latter will devote it.' '
The court held the project was not a valid public use and explicitly stated that "it
is the lease arrangement in the context of a condemnation that defeats its
validity."' 62 Thus, like in Goldberg, Jasper county has the option to return to the
court with a modified plan that complies with the public use requirement-a plan
that affords the government a sufficient amount of control over the condemned
property.
The South Carolina Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of public use
virtually eliminates the possibility of a Kelo-style taking in South Carolina.
However, even though the court has upheld its strict interpretation and is unlikely
to change it, the court in Karesh implied that public use is "elastic... in order to
keep abreast of changing social conditions, and presents a question of fact in each
particular case."'' 63 In light of this sliver of uncertainty, there is an argument that the
constitutional requirements need to be more clearly articulated to provide stronger
protections for property owners.' However, even if the state's constitution is not
amended to expressly forbid takings for economic development, the court would
have difficulty reasoning around its own precedent and the explicit text of the
constitution, which expressly forbids the taking of private property for private use
without the owners' consent. Before embracing the draconian measure of adopting
an unnecessary amendment to the state constitution, lawmakers should first dispose
of other vulnerabilities inherent in South Carolina eminent domain law.
VI. SOUTH CAROLINA LAW: SOME POTENTIAL VULNERABILrrIES

A.

The Blight Statute

Instead of focusing on a constitutional amendment, South Carolina lawmakers

should first consider clarifying the vague statutory definition of blight. The South
Carolina Supreme Court first considered blight condemnations in McNulty v.
Owens.'65 In McNulty, the Columbia Housing Authority proposed a project to
demolish a slum residential area and build a low-income housing project in its
place. 6 6 Some residents in the area sued to enjoin the Columbia Housing Authority
from carrying out the plan, arguing it did not constitute a valid public use.'67 In its

161. Ga. Dep't of Transp. v. Jasper County, 355 S.C. 638, 639, 586 S.E.2d 853, 856-57 (2005)
(quoting Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 572, 91 S.E.2d 280, 283 (1956)).
162. Id. at 639, 586 S.E.2d at 857.
163. Karesh v. City Council of Charleston, 271 S.C. 339, 342, 247 S.E.2d 342, 344 (1978).
164. Mellen, supra note 3, at 7.
165. 188 S.C. 377, 199 S.E. 425 (1938).

166. Id. at 382-83, 199 S.E. at 427-28.
167. Id. at 383, 199 S.E. at428.
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reasoning, the supreme court placed substantial weight on the legislative findings
that the poor living conditions in Columbia contributed to the city's high death and
infant mortality rates."' The court concluded that the city's "obvious need" for
habitable low-income housing and the absence of private capital to finance this type
of housing made the Columbia Housing Authority's exercise of eminent domain a
valid public use.'69
Two years after the United States Supreme Court decided Berman, the South
Carolina Supreme Court disapproved many phases of a slum clearance plan in
Edens v. City of Columbia.170 In Edens, the Columbia Housing Authority sought to
take property within a blighted area of the city, demolish the structures in that area,
and then sell the majority of the property to private persons and corporations for
light industrial use. 71' The plaintiffs inEdens owned some of the low-rent dwellings
within the area and contested the constitutionality of the Columbia Housing
Authority's use of eminent domain. 72 The court distinguished Edens fromMcNulty,
stating the Housing Authority's plan was "not a slum clearance project within the
authority of McNulty" because "[t]he project does not contemplate erection of
housing upon the land for the present residents of the area.' 7' Both McNulty and
Edens involved the taking of private residential property. However, unlike McNulty,
the court in Edens found no valid public use because the Columbia Housing
Authority did not plan to construct low-income housing for the displaced
residents. 74
The Edens court determined "the purpose [of the plan was] not to provide
better, low-cost housing to the present occupants of the area, or indeed any housing
at all; but [the purpose of the plan was] to transform it from a predominately lowclass residential area to a commercial and industrial area."' ' The court thus
concluded that "[h]owever desirable the object is from a municipal planning
viewpoint, it cannot be attained by [the] exercise of the power of eminent
domain." ' Lastly, the court pointed out that although this did not constitute a
public use under the South Carolina constitution, such a use "might

. .

. be

'
authorized by an enabling amendment of the [South Carolina] constitution."'
After Edens, between 1967 and 1971, the state constitution was amended to
give municipalities in certain counties the ability to use eminent domain to
accomplish redevelopment in blighted areas.' Article XIV of the South Carolina
Constitution carved out this exception to the otherwise narrow interpretation of

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 385-86, 199 S.E. at 429.
Id. at 386-87, 199 S.E. at 429-30.
228 S.C. 563, 573, 91 S.E.2d 280, 284 (1956).
Id. at 567, 91 S.E.2d at 280-81.
Id. at 568, 91 S.E.2d at 261.
Id. at 568, 91 S.E.2d at 280-81 (citation omitted).
Id. at 573, 91 S.E.2d at 283-84.
Id. at 573, 91 S.E.2d at 284.
Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 573, 91 S.E.2d 280, 284 (1956).
Id. at 576, 91 S.E.2d at 285.
18 S.C. JuR.rEminentDomain § 9 (1993).
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public use.'79 In Article XIV, Section 5, the South Carolina Constitution gives the
General Assembly authority to enact laws allowing municipal, housing, and
redevelopment authorities to carry out slum clearance or blight removal. The
Article also provides that these authorities can use eminent domain to condemn
property essential to the redevelopment." 0 But, the Article also includes the
following restrictions: 1) any property condemned must be essential to a preapproved redevelopment plan and 2) just compensation must be paid to the original
owner.'' Oddly, the Article only bestows this authority on the General Assembly
for use in Spartanburg, York, Charleston, Richland, Laurens, Greenville, and
Florence Counties." 2
South Carolina Code section 31-10-20(2) defines "blighted area." However,
this definition is unclear because it is one hundred and fifty seven words long and
difficult to understand. 8 3 According to the statute, an occupied area qualifies as
blighted if any five of the following sixteen factors apply:
age; dilapidation; obsolescence; deterioration; illegal use of
individual structures; presence of structures below minimum code
standards; excessive vacancies; overcrowding of structures and
community facilities; lack of ventilation, light, or sanitary
facilities; inadequate utilities; excessive land coverage;
deleterious land use or layout; depreciation of physical
maintenance; [and] lack of community planning. '
The statute also provides that the combination of any two of the following factors
will qualify a vacant area as blighted: "obsolete platting of the vacant land;
diversity of ownership of such land; tax and special assessment delinquencies on
such land; deterioration of structures
or site improvements in neighboring areas
18 5
adjacent to the vacant land.'
This definition of blighted area potentially allows a "wide range of
interpretations."'8 6 The South Carolina Policy Council pointed out that "an
apartment building [might be] 'blighted' for being 'overcrowded,' if not it may well
be for having 'excessive vacancies.' If a property does not take up too much room
('excessive land coverage') it could simply display what is amorphously titled a
'lack of community planning."'"87 Furthermore, any "deteriorating" or "aged"
building is likely to also suffer from a "depreciation of physical maintenance" and,
"dilapidation." These four factors are likely to exist concurrently. Coupled with the

179. S.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5.
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vagueness of some of the other factors, it seems likely that landowners with an
older building on their property might be safer with no structure at all. Also, if
landowners possess too much vacant property ("lack of diversity of ownership")
and the adjacent property is developed ("site improvements in neighboring areas"),
the landowners may be in danger of having their land condemned under the blight
statute. The South Carolina Policy Council argues that "[t]his is the sort of vague
and generalized understanding of 'blight' that gives the advocates of eminent
domain so much latitude."'8 8 Additionally, many landowners who own property in
blighted areas are not likely to possess the economic resources to challenge the
validity of the use of eminent domain. Therefore, the General Assembly should
investigate whether abuses have occurred and simplify the definition of blight to
ensure abuses will not occur in the future.
B. The Roadblocks to Prevailingat Trial
In addition to the vague blight statute, South Carolina residents are vulnerable
to eminent domain abuse because of the difficulties South Carolina law creates for
landowners challenging the use of eminent domain. Like the United States Supreme
Court, the South Carolina Supreme Court defers to the legislature and employs a
presumption that the "use contemplated is a necessary, permanent and public
one."' 9 The state supreme court did preserve its ability to intervene and overturn
the condemning authority, stating that "[i]f there is no necessity for the use or the
condemnation proceeding's purpose is to cloak some sinister scheme, then the
courts may interfere with the taking."'" But there are problems with this standard.
One problem is that the standard may require the plaintiff to prove a lack of
necessity where the condemning authority essentially defines the necessity.
Similarly, a plaintiff may have difficulty accessing information to prove a "sinister
scheme." Certainly no records of any such scheme would exist. This presumption
presents an almost impossible burden for a plaintiff in any eminent domain case to
overcome. Additionally, the standard fails to provide any protection for landowners
against the government abandoning its initial proposal and subsequently using the
land for an invalid purpose.
With a presumption in favor of the condemning authority and the staggering
burdens on the plaintiff, the condemning authority will win almost every time.
However, landowners may not have the resources to fight the condemnation of their
properties. As Justice O'Connor noted in Kelo, "The beneficiaries are likely to be
those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process."' 9 '
For these reasons, if the General Assembly wishes to protect private property
owners, it should eliminate the judicial presumption in favor of the condemning
authority. In addition, the General Assembly should require the condemnor to prove
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Timmons v. S.C. Tricentennial Comm'n, 254 S.C. 378, 396, 175 S.E.2d 805, 814 (1970).
Id. at 396, 175 S.E.2d at 814.
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2677 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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with reasonable certainty that the land is necessary to the government's plan and
will in fact be used in furtherance of that plan. While plaintiffs would still have the
burden of proving the taking did not satisfy the public use requirement, these
changes would give plaintiffs a fair chance to prove their case and prevent the state
from easily defeating plaintiffs by saying one thing in court and actually doing
another.
C. Abandonment of the Government's ProposedUse
Compounding the problem of the relative ease for the state prevailing at trial,
the South Carolina Supreme Court has ruled that property owners who initially fail
to get an injunction against a condemnor cannot later sue to reacquire their land if
the government subsequently decides to abandon its initial proposal. In Timmons
v. S.C. Tricentennial Commission, the court established that "[lt]he subsequent
abandonment of the original purpose for which the lands were taken would not
affect the validity of the title of the condemnation. 'The validity of title is
determined by the conditions existing at the time of the taking.""'' 92 The court
affirmed this rule in Indigo Realty Co. v. City ofCharleston.'93 In Indigo Realty, the
city purchased a building, under the threat of eminent domain, to widen Market
Street in downtown Charleston, South Carolina. 94 After purchasing the building,
the city experienced financial difficulties and abandoned the plan.' After the city
abandoned the plan, the plaintiffs asked the city to sell the property back to them
at the original purchase price. 96 A few months after the plaintiffs' request, the city
council announced plans to convey the property to a private developer in exchange
for other property.'97
In denying the property owners' request to compel the resale of the land, the
South Carolina Supreme Court stated, "It is the general rule of common law that,
when a fee simple is acquired by purchase or by eminent domain and the original
use is abandoned, there is no reversion."'9 8 The court also refused "to place a cloud
on the title of each parcel of property obtained through [the] exercise of the eminent
domain power by creating an equitable right of repurchase.""' Instead, the court
decided to defer to the legislature.2" Thus, as the law currently stands, property
owners in South Carolina must overcome a substantial burden to stop any type of
scheme concocted by a local government and also have no rights to stop a

192. Timmons, 254 S.C. at 391, 175 S.E.2d at 811 (quoting Higginson v. United States, 384 F.2d
504, 507 (6th Cir. 1967)).
193. 281 S.C. 234, 314 S.E.2d 601 (1984).
194. Id. at 235, 314 S.E.2d at 602.
195. Id. at 235, 314 S.E.2d at 602.
196. Id. at 235, 314 S.E.2d at 602.
197. Id. at 236, 314 S.E.2d at 602.
198. Id. at 236, 314 S.E.2d at 602.
199. Indigo Realty Co. v. City of Charleston, 281 S.C. 234, 237, 314 S.E.2d 601, 603 (1984).
200. Id. at 237, 314 S.E.2d at 603.
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subsequent sale of their property to a private developer where the initial proposal
was a public use.
South Carolina law still lacks the repurchase provision that the Indigo Realty
court found essential to the right of a property owner to repurchase property. In a
footnote, the Indigo Realty court pointed to a Minnesota statute that requires the
state highway department to first offer any land condemned, but later not needed,
to the previous owner.2 °1 A similar statute in South Carolina requires the state to
give the former owner of property condemned for sewerage services a one-year
opportunity to repurchase any portion of the property, for the original purchase
price, if the condemning authority does not use the land for its original purpose
within five-years of the original condemnation.2 2 Also, in York and Florence
counties, the original landowner has the first right to purchase land condemned
under the blight statute but later sold for private reuse.2" 3 Thus, under the current
law, no property owner in South Carolina whose land is initially condemned for a
valid public use has a right to repurchase their land if the initial use is abandoned.
That is of course, unless their property was condemned for sewerage services, 2" or
condemned under the blight statute in York or Florence County.20 5
South Carolina Code section 58-7-25 avoids the problems of a clouded title that
the South Carolina Supreme Court cited in support of its holding in Indigo
Realty."6 The statute gives the state five years to put the property to use.2" 7 If, after
five years, the state has not yet utilized the land, the former owner has a one-year
period to exercise the right to repurchase the land for the original just compensation
paid by the state.2"'
To protect South Carolina landowners, the General Assembly should give
former owners the right to repurchase their property in all instances where the
initial public use is abandoned and the state does not utilize the land to pursue
another valid public use within a reasonable time thereafter. A statute
encompassing all takings and constructed similar to section 58-7-25 would further
protect private property owners. Additionally, such a law would properly balance
the interest of a citizen's right to own private property with the concern for keeping
clear titles for property obtained through eminent domain.

201. See MINN. STAT. § 161.44 (2005).

202. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-7-25 (1990).
203. See S.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5 ("in cases of condemnation of land, where reuse is for private
purposes, the condemnee shall be given the first opportunity to purchase the land when it is sold by the

condemnor for such reuse").
204. S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-7-25 (1990).
205. S.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5.

206. S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-7-25 (1990).
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VII. CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Kelo did not change substantive
South Carolina law concerning the protection of private property rights. However,
the Kelo decision made the entire country aware that the Federal Takings Clause
did not provide as much protection from eminent domain as they once may have
thought. As other states start tightening their protections on private property, they
likely will look to how South Carolina has restricted the use of eminent domain.
However, simply because South Carolina is ahead of most other states in restricting
the use of eminent domain does not mean the law in South Carolina is perfect.
Given this state's high regard for private property rights, one should expect many
legislators to lead the charge in protecting their constituents from Kelo. While Kelo
is not a threat in South Carolina and probably never will be, state legislators should
investigate the smaller vulnerabilities that exist in South Carolina law. Those
concerned with strengthening private property protections in South Carolina should
urge the General Assembly to clarify the blight statute, remove the obstacles that
prevent a landowner from having a fair opportunity to prevail in court, and adopt
a statutory repurchase provision for abandoned public uses. Unlike a bill proposing
an amendment to the state constitution, these reforms have a strong likelihood of
passing into law and would do more than simply pay lip service to the further
protection of private property rights in South Carolina.
Matthew Howsare
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